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Even scholars who believe the case study is a valuable research tool are skeptical that 
researchers can effectively generalize case findings to a wider population.
1
 However, an 
exception may be possible with “least likely” (LL) and “most likely” (ML) cases, often referred 
to as “hard” and “easy” cases, respectively.  The former pose “difficult” tests of theories, in 
that—unlike ML cases—one would not expect a theory’s expectations to be borne out by a 
review of the case evidence.  According to Eckstein, LL and ML cases provide researchers with 
a great deal of inferential leverage, being “especially tailored” to either confirming or 
disconfirming a theory, respectively.
2
  Such case study designs are common in the discipline of 
International Relations, particularly in the subfield of security studies.  Since 1997, at least 36 
articles appearing in Security Studies explicitly invoked the logic of LL/ML studies to justify 
their case selection and defend or impugn the validity of particular theories.
3
 The appeal of a 
study that might offer in-depth knowledge of a particular case and the generalizability of large-n 
cross-unit comparisons is obvious.   
Despite the widespread use of LL/ML cases there remains a considerable amount of 
imprecision regarding their definition.  Researchers’ applications of the LL or ML labels 
typically appear plausible, but further investigation often yields uncertainty about the validity of 
a case’s purported difficulty.  Such questions have been central to some of the most significant 
developments in security studies in the past two decades.  For instance, the emergence of 
constructivist scholarship on “traditional” security issues in the 1990s had a major impact on the 
field, in part because such matters were alleged to be particularly hard cases for theories that 
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privileged norms, identity, and culture to explain.
4
  However, this assertion was soon challenged 
by scholars who contended that constructivists studying international security had actually 
chosen easy cases to test their theories.
5
  This and other episodes demonstrate that the logic 
surrounding LL/ML cases deserves careful scrutiny, both for the sake of methodological rigor 
and disciplinary progress.  
This article addresses ambiguities surrounding LL/ML cases and provides concrete steps 
researchers are encouraged to follow to determine how “hard” a case is for particular theories.  It 
uses examples from research on security matters to demonstrate how scholars can draw 
generalizable inferences from cases, as well as illustrate potential pitfalls researchers may 
confront.  The first section of this article introduces the two ways scholars typically justify 
claims that a case is LL or ML, what I deem the “countervailing conditions” and Bayesian 
approaches. It briefly outlines the relationship between the two approaches, particularly focusing 
on the consequences of neglecting Bayesian insights when drawing inferences from case 
evidence. The next two sections more closely examine the core elements of the CC and Bayesian 
rationales, respectively, further explaining the assertions made in the first section. The necessary 
steps a researcher must take to determine the degree to which a case is ML or LL are also laid 
out in detail. The fourth section examines a study of the non-use of nuclear weapons during the 
Vietnam War to show how better understanding of both rationales can affect how cases are 
categorized and inferences reached.  The article concludes by considering how LL/ML cases can 
contribute to research in security studies given constraints imposed by theory and evidence. 
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RATIONALES FOR CHOOSING LL AND ML CASES 
Researchers’ rationales for describing cases as LL or ML generally fall into two 
categories.  The most common is the countervailing conditions (CC) approach, which focuses on 
the details of a specific case. According to this rationale, LL cases are those with characteristics 
the researcher expects will promote some outcome other than that predicted by the primary 
theory they are testing. Conversely, ML cases feature characteristics that should facilitate rather 
than hinder the outcome expected by said theory.  The second, increasingly discussed rationale 
used to identify LL/ML cases follows a Bayesian logic. This approach attends more to the 
population from which a case was drawn, defining a case as LL or ML according to a 
researcher’s prior confidence that the theory being tested offers a valid explanation for the 
outcome of interest in other, similar cases. Regardless of rationale, cases fall on a continuum of 
how likely they are to support a theory’s expectations.6 Cases are apt to be “less” or “more” 
likely to support a theory rather than “least” or “most.”  For simplicity, however, this article 
refers to cases as if they are LL, ML, or neither.   
As will be shown, the CC approach is actually nested within a Bayesian framework, and 
researchers who ignore the implications of Bayesian reasoning may draw substantially different 
inferences from their case evidence than if they had taken prior confidence in a theory into 
account.  First, if prior confidence in a novel theory is neglected, researchers will be more liable 
to define cases used to test the theory as ML.  This in turn increases the chances they will reject 
theories whose expectations are not met in initial case studies. Alternatively, Bayesianism lowers 
one’s confidence that any case will support the expectations of a novel theory, given the lack of 
prior information regarding the theory’s explanatory power and scope conditions needed for it to 
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operate.  Researchers who factor Bayesian insights into their studies should thus be more willing 
to subject new theories to further tests even if they “fail” in an initial case, selecting new cases 
based on updated beliefs about where the theory might be applied.  Second, according to the 
Bayesian perspective the difficulty of a case depends in part on the number of theories that could 
explain the outcome of interest. Every plausible alternative to the theory of interest the 
researcher identifies will decrease confidence in the latter, even if all the theories expect the 
same outcome in a case.  Researchers who neglect Bayesianism will thus again be more likely to 
apply the ML label to cases and firmly reject theories that fail to account for case outcomes.  
Lastly, from the Bayesian perspective there is such a thing as cases that are too hard or easy in 
that they do not allow researchers to generalize about the theory of interest. Overly ML cases are 
those that resemble numerous others that a theory has convincingly explained in the past.  
Because confidence in the theory in question is so high to begin with, a single “failure” in such a 
case will not do much to undermine that confidence.
7
  Similarly, overly LL cases resemble others 
which a theory has repeatedly failed to explain in the past, or those an alternative theory has 
explained in an overwhelmingly convincing fashion.  In contrast, those who neglect prior 
confidence in a theory presume that the harder or easier a case is the more inferential leverage it 
provides. 
 
THE COUNTERVAILING CONDITIONS RATIONALE 
  A countervailing condition is a variable whose presence (or specific value) in a chosen 
case decreases the probability the researcher will observe the outcome posited by the theory 
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being tested.  Though he did not use the terminology here, Eckstein expressed the CC rationale 
for designating cases as LL/ML in his seminal article on case study methods.
8
  Eckstein did not 
lay out precise steps for determining how difficult a test a case posed for a particular theory, 
instead using Michels’ proposition that oligarchy is an “iron law” in organizations to 
demonstrate the LL case-selection strategy.
9
  Michels chose to examine horizontally structured 
political parties with strongly expressed democratic values.  He reasoned that if rule by small 
groups of elites was observed in such cases, more confidence could be placed in his assertions 
about the ubiquity of oligarchy.  In sum, Michels chose cases in which he determined there were 
strong countervailing conditions that would hinder the emergence of oligarchy, oligarchic rule 
being the outcome he expected to observe given his own theory.   
The CC logic is often invoked by researchers in security studies whose theories stress the 
importance of values, norms, and ideas rather than states’ material capacities to explain case 
outcomes.  A typical version of this argument holds that “Because realists argue that ideational 
factors are even less important when national security (or ‘high politics’) is at stake, ideational 
variables should exert little influence [on policy choice].”10 In other words, the high stakes 
realists assert are attached to security politics are expected to overwhelm evaluations of whether 
a policy option is consistent with an actor’s social identity or notions of appropriateness, even if 
these latter considerations are politically salient.  If this is so, “ideational variables” would have 
to exert especially strong effects on policy choice for their expected outcome to prevail when 
realism predicted a divergent outcome in the same case. 
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There are three general steps necessary for selecting a case using the CC rationale.  These 
steps may appear misleading in their simplicity; complications in the CC case-selection process 
are addressed in the subsections that follow.  First, researchers must make sure to select cases 
that fall within the scope conditions of both the theory of interest—the primary theory being 
tested—and those of any alternative explanations under examination. Second, for all theories 
under examination the researcher must be able to derive clear, specific expectations about what 
outcome should be observed given the antecedent conditions in the chosen case.  Cases cannot 
pose LL/ML tests unless the theories under examination posit clear probabilistic relationships or 
determinative laws.
11
 They should be precise enough that, for categorical dependent variables, 
only one outcome can be consistent with a theory’s expectations in a given case, or a small range 
of outcomes for continuous dependent variables.  If numerous alternative outcomes in a case can 
be reconciled with a theory post hoc, evaluating the fit between theory and evidence becomes 
difficult.  It is also highly desirable to be able to clearly specify the intervening mechanisms 
between the explanatory variables highlighted by a theory and the dependent variable.  
Researchers are then able to determine whether these mechanisms were in fact “activated” but 
countervailed against, or were completely inoperative. 
Third, the researcher determines how difficult a test a case poses for a specific theory by 
identifying the strength of countervailing conditions present.  Say a researcher drew on a 
formulation of democratic peace theory to argue that disputes between democratic states should 
be resolved peacefully.  In a dispute between two democracies, a countervailing condition 
against the expected outcome—peaceful resolution—might be a rapid shift in the balance of 
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power that made credible commitments problematic.
12
  Countervailing conditions should be 
derived from well-specified alternative theories and supported by evidence demonstrating they 
have the effects the claimed for them. 
According to the CC rationale, a case is LL if the researcher can identify a set of 
variables that strongly countervail against the outcome the theory of interest expects to occur.  
The more countervailing conditions the author can identify, and the stronger the logic and 
evidence establishing why these conditions would lead to an outcome that diverges from that 
expected by the theory of interest, the less likely one is to observe the outcome that theory 
predicts in the chosen case.  LL cases have been described as “hyper-strong” and “unfair” tests 
because the variables highlighted by a valid theory might not appear to affect outcomes given the 
presence of strong countervailing conditions.
13
 However, LL cases are only unfair tests if used to 
disconfirm theories, and should not be used for such purposes.  Although failure in an LL case 
does not undermine a theory, success strongly indicates its generalizability: if a theory’s 
expectations are met even when numerous conditions in a case indicate some divergent outcome 
should occur (e.g., war rather than peace), one would expect the theory could explain comparable 
cases where countervailing conditions were not as strong. Analogously, observing that someone 
ran and completed a marathon allows us to confidently assert that, ceteris paribus, they could 
also run and complete shorter races.  Conversely, failure in a hard case by no means eliminates 
the possibility that the outcome a theory expects would occur in easier cases, just as knowledge 
that someone failed in their attempt to finish a marathon does not preclude the possibility they 
could complete a shorter distance. 
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For a case to qualify as ML, a researcher needs to identify conditions that a theory 
expects to exert particularly strong effects on the outcome of interest, and make sure the case 
features few if any countervailing conditions identified by alternative theories. Cases whose 
antecedent conditions lead the theory of interest to expect extreme values of the dependent 
variable are good candidates for selection as ML, as the effects of the theory’s explanatory 
variables are more likely to be detected.
14
 Success in an ML case does not provide strong support 
for a theory, but failure indicates it is unlikely to explain the outcome of interest in comparable 
cases.  To use the running analogy, knowledge that someone could not complete a run around a 
mile-long track largely precludes the possibility that person could run around the same track 26 
times consecutively. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 This is represented in Figure 1.  The y-axis represents the theory of interest a researcher 
is investigating, while the x-axis represents an alternative theory.  Cases are arrayed within the 
plane formed by these axes according to how strongly each theory would expect an outcome to 
occur given the values of the variables in a case.  Outcomes could be categorical, such as the 
presence or absence of a military alliance between two states, or continuous, such as the 
percentage change in a country’s military spending in a given year.   The farther a case falls 
above the x-axis, the more strongly the variables deemed relevant by the theory of interest 
predict a “positive” outcome (e.g. a large increase in military spending or high probability of an 
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alliance); conversely, the theory predicts increasingly “negative” outcomes the farther a case 
falls below the x-axis. Likewise, the alternative theory expects increasingly positive outcomes 
for cases falling farther to the right of the y-axis, and negative outcomes for cases to the left.  
The theories each yield less certain predictions for cases falling near the intersection of the two 
axes.  Their respective variables are at values expected to have weak effects on the outcome of 
interest, and random measurement error is more likely to “push” the case from one quadrant of 
the plane to another.  Because LL/ML cases require theories with specific expectations about 
what outcome should occur, cases near the origin in Figure 1 should be avoided. 
 ML cases fall in the northeast and southwest quadrants of the plane because the 
alternative reinforces the expectations of the theory of interest that a positive or negative 
outcome will occur, respectively.  Since there are no countervailing pressures in these quadrants, 
the farther a case moves from the x-axis the more strongly the theory of interest expects a 
positive or negative outcome in a given case.  Cases become increasingly ML, or “easy”, and the 
inferences one can draw if the outcome the theory of interest expects does not occur in these 
cases thus become increasingly strong.   
The northwest and southeast quadrants are more complicated.  Here, the case variables 
highlighted by the alternative explanation countervail against the outcome expected by the theory 
of interest at varying levels of intensity.  Along the dashed diagonal line, the variables 
highlighted by both theories are at levels that roughly offset one another.  For instance, in the 
northwest quadrant the theory of interest predicts a positive outcome in each case along the 
diagonal just as strongly as the alternative predicts a negative outcome.  The farther a case falls 
off the diagonal to the left in the northwest quadrant, the more strongly the variables highlighted 
by the alternative countervail against the outcome the theory of interest predicts.  These cases are 
11 
 
increasingly LL, and the inferences one can draw if the outcome the theory of interest expects 
does occur in these cases thus become increasingly strong.  Michels’ cases fall in this 
northwestern region: his theory predicts the “positive” outcome of oligarchic governance even 
though other factors strongly predict democratic practices to dominate.   
Conversely, the farther a case falls off the diagonal to the right in the northwest quadrant, 
or to the left in the southeast, the less strongly the variables highlighted by the alternative 
countervail against the outcome the theory of interest predicts.  If a case falls very far up the y-
axis—what could be called an “extreme” case—and far off the diagonal, it is an ML case for the 
theory of interest even though there are weakly countervailing pressures present.  An extreme 
case is one in which the key variables in a theory adopt values one would expect to have a 
substantially greater-than-average impact on the dependent variable, which should then take on a 
value far from the norm in comparable cases.
15
 George and Bennett, as well as Levy, 
characterize Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the manner just described.16  It is an 
extreme case for the unitary actor model of national security behavior. Government action should 
be much more unified than in non-crisis situations, when parochial bureaucracies would be 
expected to have more sway. Conversely, the crisis is not an extreme case for the organizational 
and bureaucratic models of national security behavior, which expect disjointed decision-making 
based on differences in government agencies’ established routines and interests.  Both theories’ 
expectations countervail against one another.  However, in contrast to the unitary actor model, 
there was nothing about the crisis in Cuba expected to augment the effects of standard operating 
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procedures or bureaucratic interests on decision-making. The crisis is thus ML for the unitary 
actor model and LL for the alternatives Allison explores.
17
  If the presence of unified decision-
making is the dependent variable and the unitary model treated as the theory of interest, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis falls above the diagonal in the northwest quadrant of Figure 1. 
 
Scope Conditions 
Scope conditions define the set of cases to which a theory is applicable, meaning its 
explanatory variables are expected to be able to affect the outcome of interest.
18
  Whether or not 
these effects actually manifest themselves as expected by the theory is an empirical question. To 
be meaningful, the claim that a case is LL/ML should refer to its difficulty for a theory relative to 
other cases also within that theory’s scope conditions.  This may seem obvious, but scholars have 
made confusing pronouncements on this point.  Van Evera defines an LL test as one in which a 
researcher “evaluates theories under circumstances that lack the antecedent conditions [the 
theories] require to operate,” but such cases are by definition beyond a theory’s scope and thus 
provide no information pertinent to the theory’s validity.19  To use an absurd example, if a theory 
meant to explain war onset does not account for the amount of compensatory damages awarded 
by juries in injury litigation, this clearly does not impugn the theory.  Unfortunately, violations of 
a theory’s scope conditions are never so obvious.  However, if one is testing a well-specified 
theory it should be possible to determine which conditions are necessary for the theory to be 
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applicable, and also what nominal scope conditions are in fact arbitrary restrictions meant to 
protect the theory.   
If a theory “succeeds” in explaining the outcome in a case beyond its scope conditions 
the researcher might have missed an important piece of evidence demonstrating the case actually 
falls within the theory’s scope. This might also indicate the theory is poorly specified, meaning 
the researcher has excluded background conditions and/or causal pathways by which its 
explanatory variables can influence the outcome being studied.
20
 If that is so, then “success” in 
this case actually requires revision of the theory, which can hardly be considered a confirmatory 
result.  An under-specified theory also raises the question of whether its expectations for the case 
in question were precise enough to justify calling it an LL or ML test in the first place.   
More ambiguously, Levy contends that an LL case is one “in which the theory’s scope 
conditions are satisfied weakly if at all.”21  The sizeable problems introduced by the clause “if at 
all” have been discussed—if a case does not at all fall within a theory’s scope conditions, the LL 
label cannot apply. It is less clear what the consequences of a theory’s scope conditions being 
“satisfied weakly” are.  Scope conditions might be weakly satisfied if there remains some 
uncertainty as to whether or not a case actually falls within them.  If the researcher fails to realize 
they have chosen a case outside the theory’s scope conditions, they may erroneously conclude 
their theoretical expectations were not met because of strong countervailing conditions rather 
than the theory being inapplicable.  This will lead them to draw improper inferences about the 
relative strength of different variables’ causal effects, when in actuality no meaningful 
information about the theory can be ascertained from the case. In the face of uncertainty 
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pertaining to scope conditions, more fine-grained theory specification and exploratory research is 
merited before LL/ML cases are selected.  Still, a Bayesian interpretation of weakly satisfied 
scope conditions can more sensibly categorize a case as LL than can the CC framework, if 
“weakly satisfied” is taken to mean an existing theory is being applied to a new empirical 
domain.  This is expanded upon in the section on Bayesianism below.    
To elaborate upon the issue of scope conditions and LL/ML studies, return to the 
question of whether cases relevant to national security are particularly hard for constructivist 
theories to explain.  The contributors to The Culture of National Security claim to focus on “hard 
cases… that favor well-established perspectives in the field of national security.”  As becomes 
clear, the alternative perspectives are structural theories, particularly neorealism.
22
 Desch soon 
challenged the contention that constructivists had selected LL cases to test their theories: citing 
Eckstein, he argued constructivist scholarship had actually used “most likely” cases for 
“culturalist theories” and “least likely cases for the realist alternative.”23 Setting aside the 
inability of scholars to agree on the basic features of a case that would make it LL or ML, lost in 
the debate was the important question of neorealism’s scope.   
Neorealism continues to be one of the primary foils for constructivist theories of security, 
from which purported countervailing conditions are drawn.  However, concurrent with emerging 
constructivist approaches to security studies, realists themselves were enmeshed in a debate over 
whether any specific case of foreign policy-making fell within the scope of structural versions of 
the theory.  Waltz consistently maintained they did not: neorealism could only explain outcomes 
                                                          
22
 Katzenstein, “Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” 11, 12-17. 
23
 For example, Desch contends it is unsurprising that humanitarian concerns best explain policy choices in 
cases studied by constructivists, as the material concerns realists argue policymakers to prioritize above all others 
did not countervail against other values at issue; Desch, “Culture Clash,” 159-160. 
15 
 
at the international level of analysis.
24
  If so, then cases could not be categorized as LL by dint of 
countervailing conditions derived from neorealism, because the theory would be inapplicable to 
specific cases of foreign policy.  Ironically, constructivist scholars who employ neorealism to 
justify the LL label for cases sometimes endorse this point.  Declaring cases of national security 
policy “hard” because of neorealist theory, Katzenstein continues that “Neorealism is too general 
and underspecified to tell us anything about the direction of balancing, let alone the content of 
the national security policies of states.” At best, he states, scholars wishing to apply neorealism 
to specific cases have to “graft” additional variables onto the theory in an ad hoc fashion, 
resulting in a substantially modified explanatory framework.
25
 In short, Katzenstein agrees with 
Waltz that unless neorealism is substantially modified, specific cases of foreign policy are 
beyond its scope. Likewise, Kier contends that developments in French military doctrine in the 
1920s and 1930s should be an “easy case” for structural realism to explain, but then contradicts 
this argument by noting that the international balance of power—the theory’s dominant 
explanatory variable—“does not provide determinate explanations for choices between offensive 
and defensive doctrines.”26 If the balance of power never yields specific predictions of the 
substance of states’ military doctrines, it is fair to say the question is beyond neorealism’s scope.  
Such a claim is suspect, per the work of Posen and others.
27
  But if Kier only means the status of 
the balance of power does not lend itself to precise predictions in the French case, then it still 
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cannot be said to strongly countervail against the effects of variables highlighted by her own 
theory.  Both Katzenstein and Kier’s points undercut the inferential leverage their otherwise 
valuable scholarship can claim.  
 
Case-specific Expectations 
Carefully specifying a theory and checking to see whether a case fits within its scope 
does not guarantee that one can derive precise expectations of what outcome should be observed 
if the theory is correct.  This need not mean the theory itself contains logical contradictions.  
Instead, different variables highlighted by the theory may actually countervail against each other 
in a specific case.  For example, Theis examines the foreign policy behavior of the United States 
from 1783-1814 to test whether neorealism accurately explains how states are socialized into 
adopting particular types of security behavior.  Setting aside the issue of neorealism’s scope, 
Theis argues that the relative weakness of the U.S. during this period should have made the 
country adopt “an overriding concern with the external environment and potential threats to its 
survival,” perhaps making it an “easy case” for neorealist accounts of socialization.  However, he 
also observes that the United States’ geographic distance from great powers in Europe limited 
opportunities for socialization and arguably makes the early U.S. a “hard case” for neorealism.28  
Theis’s interpretation of neorealism highlights two different factors, military strength and 
the intensity of state interactions with great powers, that countervail against one another in the 
case he has chosen. This hinders the researcher’s ability to say what outcome should be expected 
in the chosen case, and thus neither the LL nor ML label can be confidently applied.  Generally, 
the more variables a theory expects to affect the outcome of interest, the harder it is to select 
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particular cases with which to conduct LL/ML tests.  Complex explanations will often contain 
numerous countervailing conditions when applied to specific cases, making it much harder to 
determine what outcome the theory expects. Complex theories exempt from this claim would 
have to highlight variables which were a) positively correlated with one another and b) all either 
positively or negatively correlated with the dependent variable rather than having opposing 
effects.  Outside these rare instances, parsimonious theories are more easily subjected to LL/ML 
tests.   
Although cases for which a theory does not have precise expectations cannot pose easy or 
difficult tests of that theory, they can be used to learn about the relative impact of different 
variables the theory highlights. In the study just described, Theis concludes that the young 
United States was socialized to behave in a manner consistent with neorealism.  This finding 
comes despite the fact that the country’s distance from the great powers of the era arguably 
limited opportunities for the U.S to be socialized to adopt realist security practices.  Thus, one 
might tentatively conclude that a state’s relative power influences its susceptibility to 
socialization more than the density of its interactions with other states.
29
  The implications of this 
finding could then be further examined in regards to related variants of realism, such as “balance 
of threat” theory, that stress both geography (with its implications for state interactions) and 
military power as crucial factors influencing alliance formation.
30
 
Requiring precise theoretical expectations for a given case is not equivalent to requiring a 
particular outcome to occur in that case for it to count as LL/ML.  If a theory predicts that 
outcome Y will be observed in a case, and Y does in fact occur, this has no more bearing on the 
case’s “hardness” than if some other outcome had been observed. Rather, it is the strength of 
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countervailing conditions that matters when defining cases. However, there is confusion in the 
literature on this point.  Specifically, Gerring defines an LL case as “one that, on all dimensions 
except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, and yet 
does so.”  Gerring insists that for a case to be LL the outcome one would expect from the 
dimension of interest must occur. Similarly, he asserts for a case to be ML, the outcome one 
would expect from the dimensions that are not of interest cannot occur: “A ‘most-likely’ case is 
one that, on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted to achieve a 
certain outcome, and yet does not.”31  For practical purposes these definitions are logically 
indistinguishable. In both instances the antecedent conditions in the case countervail against the 
expectation yielded by the “dimension of theoretical interest.”   In neither definition is the 
outcome expected by the theory of interest consistent with that expected by the countervailing 
dimensions. These are both essentially definitions of LL cases.  The only difference is that the 
latter definition allows for a much wider set of outcomes: the outcome expected by the 
dimensions other than that of theoretical interest cannot occur, but any other outcome is allowed.  
After all, it does not follow that the outcome expected by the theory of interest must be observed 
when other theories fail. 
There are further reasons why observed outcomes should not define cases.  If a theory 
fails to account for the outcome in an LL case researchers cannot conclude it is strongly 
disconfirmed, but may better infer how strongly the variables it highlights impact the dependent 
variable relative to those in alternative theories.  If a theory—even one not primarily of interest 
to a researcher—passes an easy test in an ML case it may be worth testing it against a broader set 
of evidence to examine how generalizable it is.  Furthermore, selecting ML cases in which the 
outcome favored by a theory does occur gives the researcher the opportunity to examine its 
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hypothesized intervening causal mechanisms, which should be highly visible. Fravel employs 
this “modified most likely case study research design” in his research on diversionary war.  He 
examines Argentina in 1982 and Turkey in 1974, which should be ML cases for diversionary 
theory due to high levels of political unrest and other facilitating conditions. The theory’s 
expected outcome is observed in both cases: Argentina invaded the Falkland (Malvinas) islands, 
and Turkey invaded Cyprus.  Fravel correctly notes that when a theory’s key explanatory 
variables take on values strongly expected to lead to a specific case outcome, and that outcome is 
in fact observed, the intervening mechanisms hypothesized by the theory can also be expected to 
be present.  If process-tracing nevertheless fails to uncover these mechanisms, this is strong 
disconfirmatory evidence for the theory in an ML case.
32  
 
Fravel’s use of process-tracing in an ML case also illustrates a problem with the assertion 
that the “most likely design is intended to test whether X affects Y, rather than how X affects 
Y.”33 As long as the theory in question carefully specifies the intervening mechanisms between 
X and Y, the distinction between “whether” and “how” is one without a difference.  If the 
expected value of the primary dependent variable is observed, the researcher can then choose as 
a new dependent variable the intervening mechanism between X and Y that should also be 
affected as the theory expects given the case outcome.
34
  Having a good sense of a theory’s 
intervening mechanisms is similarly useful in LL cases where the expected outcome is not 
observed. One can then determine whether these mechanisms were in fact operating but 
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countered by the effects of variables emphasized by alternative theories, or the mechanisms 
never even manifested themselves and thus countervailing conditions were not necessary to 
understand the theory’s failure.  The latter scenario suggests the reach of the theory is more 
circumscribed than does the former.
35
   
 
Identifying Countervailing Conditions 
Case studies are more adept at finding the “causes of effects,” or the processes that 
influence an outcome of interest, than the “effects of causes”, or the average effect some variable 
has on an outcome.
36
  Nevertheless, the claim that a case’s conditions strongly or weakly 
countervail against the expectations of the theory of interest presupposes that one can arrange the 
causal variables according to the strength of their effects on the dependent variable. Although 
researchers using cases studies will not assign numerical coefficients to variables, as with 
regression analysis, they do need to justify claims as to whether or not some variable will have a 
strong countervailing effect vis-à-vis variables highlighted by the theory of interest.   This is why 
such claims should be based on pre-existing theories supported by empirical research that 
provides a reliable idea of whether different variables should have strong, moderate, or weak 
effects on the outcome under investigation.
37
  
Although this advice is often reflected in security studies research, scholars sometimes 
claim a case is LL without citing any rival theory or research to support these assertions. One 
possible reason for the occasional neglect of research featuring alternative theories may be that 
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prominent works on case study methods employ definitions that are easy to misinterpret.  For 
instance, George and Bennett define an LL case as one in which “the independent variables in a 
theory are at values that only weakly predict an outcome or predict a low-magnitude outcome.”38 
Researchers looking to follow this definition are posed with two difficulties. First, it is unclear 
why a case presents a difficult test simply because a theory predicts a low-magnitude outcome.  
Plausible interpretations of “low-magnitude” is that some outcome is either absent (e.g. “no war 
occurred”) or well below its average value in comparable cases (“there were very few casualties 
during the military intervention”). If key variables specified by a theory lead the researcher to 
expect a low-magnitude outcome in a case, and no factors are identified which countervail 
against this expectation, then the case is in fact ML for that theory—it would fall within the 
southwest quadrant of Figure 1.  Observing a “high-magnitude” outcome—large numbers of 
casualties in an intervention when the theory predicts few will occur, for instance—would be 
disconfirmatory evidence.  Furthermore, a case could be LL for a theory in which it predicts a 
high-magnitude outcome.  If a theory expects a military intervention to result in greater than 
average casualties, but alternative theories cite strong reasons for casualties to be limited or non-
existent, this intervention would be an LL case for the first theory given the CC rationale, and it 
would fall below the diagonal in the northwest quadrant in Figure 1.  To reiterate, outcomes 
alone do not define LL/ML cases.   
 A greater difficulty arises in trying to interpret what is meant by “weakly predict.”  If a 
theory only weakly predicts outcome Y, then Y should have a low probability of occurring. This 
might be because the theory is largely indeterminate for a given case—Y is just one of multiple 
outcomes that could be reconciled with the theory.  Similarly, Levy holds that a case may be LL 
if the “values of many of the theory’s key variables point in [the] other direction” from the value 
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of the dependent variable expected.
39
 Again, the case then probably does not allow the researcher 
to say whether the theory’s expectations are met, as it contains numerous variables the theory 
expects to countervail against one another in that instance, and the LL label cannot fit.  It is 
unlikely this is George and Bennett’s meaning, however, as they argue that for a theory to be 
subjected to “strong tests” it should “posit high-probability… relations between variables of 
interest” and forbid the possibility of numerous different outcomes in any case.40 The case might 
also strongly undermine the theory being tested, a possibility that arises from Levy’s definition.  
If numerous elements of a theory indicate the outcome of interest is unlikely to be observed in a 
case, and the outcome nevertheless occurs, this clearly calls the generalizability of the theory into 
question.  This is why LL cases must derive countervailing conditions from alternatives to the 
main theory being tested: to avoid indeterminate expectations and erroneous inferences. 
To further illustrate the confusion that can result from ambiguous definitions of LL cases, 
consider Kaufman’s largely well-done research on ethnic violence. In one article Kaufman 
evaluates three theories, including an elite-predation explanation in which ethnic leaders seek to 
secure power by provoking intergroup conflict, and a theory of symbolic politics that holds 
violence is driven by myths that justify hostility towards out-groups.
41
  Citing George and 
Bennett’s definition of LL cases, he argues that the emergence of ethnic violence in Sudan in 
1983 is a “tough test” for both theories “because key causal factors identified by each theory are 
questionable.” According to Kaufman, the Sudanese leader in 1983 was unlikely to become a 
predatory leader or encourage hostile symbolic narratives towards outgroups.
42
  However, 
contrary to Kaufman’s assertion, this either makes the Sudanese case indeterminate or ML for 
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both theories.   If the “questionable” status of the theories’ key variables is taken to mean they 
are measured with great uncertainty—measurement error being another source of weak 
predictions—or at levels that are insufficient to have a reliable impact on levels of ethnic 
violence, then one cannot derive precise expectations from either theory and the LL label cannot 
apply.  Conversely, it could be plausibly argued that both theories expect the same low-
magnitude outcome—“no violence”—to occur. They thus do not countervail against each other, 
and the ML label would be more fitting.  Because both theories predict a negative outcome, the 
absence of ethnic violence, the Sudan case falls in the southwest quadrant of Figure 1. 
The fundamental issue with George and Bennett’s definition of LL cases is that it can 
lead researchers to confuse the precision of a theory’s expectations with the strength of the 
causal effects posited by the theory’s key variables. A more easily understood revision of their 
initial wording, consistent with George and Bennett’s broader methodological discussion, would 
eschew references to the magnitude of outcomes or the weakness of predictions.  Instead, it 
would state that an LL case is one in which the independent variables in a theory are at values 
that predict a specific outcome, but not at values expected to have a stronger-than-normal effect 
on the dependent variable.  Additionally, the case must feature conditions exogenous to the 
theory that would lead one to expect a different outcome.  Given George and Bennett’s emphasis 
on the importance of taking the expectations of alternative theories into account, as well as 
constructing theories with precise expectations, this is the clearest and most plausible 
interpretation of their meaning.   
 
THE BAYESIAN RATIONALE 
The CC rationale for selecting cases includes an implicit Bayesian element.  The claim 
24 
 
that a case is an LL test for a theory because one can derive strong countervailing conditions 
from another theoretical explanation implies that, a priori, the researcher believes there is a 
reasonable probability the alternative is a valid explanation for the outcome of interest. If this 
were not so, the nominal “countervailing” conditions in the case would not actually pose a hard 
test for the researcher’s theory. Eckstein hints at a Bayesian rationale for selecting cases by 
arguing that a case may be LL/ML based on “prevailing theory.”43 Similarly, Snyder writes that 
for a case to qualify as LL for a researcher’s theory, the competing theory should have “home-
court advantage.”44  This is to say the case belongs to a broader class for which the competing 
theory has been demonstrated to be a plausible explanation for the outcome of interest, while the 
researcher’s own theory has not.  McKeown argues this is an informal “folk Bayesian 
perspective,” and he and others have more thorough in detailing this logic as applied to LL/ML 
cases.
45
  
Bayesian inference rests on three “legs”: the strength of one’s prior beliefs about a 
theory; how closely evidence in a case fits theoretical expectations; and the typicality of the 
evidence in a case. In formal terms, Bayesian tests of a theory are evaluated according to 
𝑃(𝑇|𝐸) =  
𝑃(𝑇)𝑃(𝐸|𝑇)
𝑃(𝐸)
 
Researchers update their beliefs about a theory given the evidence E in a case— 𝑃(𝑇|𝐸), their 
“posterior” beliefs.  Prior confidence in the theory—P(T)—is multiplied by the likelihood one 
would observe E in the chosen case given the expectations of the theory, or P(E|T).  This 
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evaluation is divided by the overall probability of observing E at all given its prevalence in the 
population of interest—the broader class from which the case is drawn.  P(E) captures all the 
ways the evidence might have been generated in addition to the mechanisms specified by the 
theory of interest.  To see this formally, it helps to re-write Bayes’ theorem as  
𝑃(𝑇𝑖|𝐸) =  
𝑃(𝑇𝑖)𝑃(𝐸|𝑇𝑖)
∑ 𝑃(𝑇𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )𝑃(𝐸|𝑇𝑗)
 
The denominator shows there are n theories indexed by j that can generate the evidence E with 
varying probabilities, including the theory of interest Ti.  Summed together, these probabilities 
equal P(E). The values of the posterior and numerator change as the researcher goes back and 
forth between theory and evidence in different cases, while the value of the denominator is 
constant. 
All else being equal, posterior confidence in a theory is greater if prior confidence was 
high or if the “fit” between theory and evidence in the chosen case is strong—especially if there 
is fit despite countervailing conditions.  One’s confidence in the theory also increases if the 
evidence one observes rarely occurs in comparable cases.  Conversely, it is not impressive if 
one’s theory is only supported by commonplace occurrences that one would expect by chance 
alone. For instance, one observable implication of the argument that states are engaging in “soft 
balancing” against the U.S. is that countries will take diplomatic actions to impede the realization 
of American foreign policy goals.
46
  Skeptics of this argument have countered that such actions 
are ubiquitous: they are part of “unipolar politics as usual” or “normal diplomatic friction.”47  In 
short, this evidence cited in favor of soft balancing is so commonplace that we are likely to 
observe it regardless of whether soft balancing is taking place or not.  Those who doubt the 
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validity of the soft-balancing proposition would presumably be more persuaded if it accounted 
for unusual international events that one would not expect due to chance.  Even unusual evidence 
that only seems explicable in light of a given theory must also be able to be reliably interpreted, 
accurate, and provide information about alternative explanations that could have generated the 
observed outcome.  If the methods used to gather and interpret the available evidence are 
suspect, one should not substantially update their posterior confidence in a theory.
48
  As with the 
CC approach to LL/ML cases, the possibility of measurement error means the degree to which 
countervailing pressures are present or absent, as well arguments about whether a theory’s 
expectations are met in a case, might both be subject to substantial revision.  
There are five general steps researchers using the Bayesian framework must go through 
when selecting cases.  The three steps used in the CC rationale—checking scope conditions, 
making sure theories have clear and precise expectations for the case at hand, and identifying the 
strength of countervailing conditions in the case—all still apply. Fourth, researchers must 
evaluate the strength of their prior confidence in all theories being examined given the selected 
case.  An ML case is one in which prior confidence in a theory is high, indicating its expectations 
are “highly likely to be confirmed” when tested against the case.49  The most straight-forward 
way to justify confidence that a theory’s expectations will be met is to demonstrate that the case 
strongly resembles “typical” cases in which the theory’s expectations have previously been 
met.
50
  This means it features numerous relevant conditions that were also observed in previously 
studied cases in which the theory was shown to be a good explanation for the outcome of 
interest. Whether or not the theory or competing alternatives best explain the outcome in the 
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newly selected case is an empirical question.  Conversely, McKeown states that a  “‘hard case’ 
for a theory… would be one where the prior probability of a theory being a correct explanation is 
low but the degree of confidence in that prior assessment is not high.”51 This translates to the 
assertion that a researcher’s prior beliefs about the theory being tested given the chosen case are 
“uninformative.”  Any effects a theory’s explanatory variables might be observed to have on the 
dependent variable are equally likely a priori, including the possibility that they have no impact.  
A researcher’s prior beliefs might be uninformative if the theory is novel and untested—there are 
few if any prior observations with which to evaluate it.  It might also be that the theory has been 
tested in a context that only remotely resembles that in which the researcher is interested, leading 
to questions about its external validity.   
Lastly, after accounting for alternative theories and their prior probability, the researcher 
may find it necessary to re-adjust their initial prior confidence in the theory of interest.  The 
greater the prior probability of the alternatives, the less likely the theory of interest is to prove a 
plausible explanation. As the Bayesian rationale is employed informally, the researcher need not 
put their prior beliefs in quantitative terms, but should clearly explain why one should be 
relatively (un)confident in a theory prior to examining the evidence in the case they have chosen 
to study. 
 
Comparing the Two Rationales 
 Bennett and Elman explicitly state that LL cases follow a Bayesian logic, saying that 
outcomes must be evaluated against “extant theory” and that cases become harder tests for a 
theory of interest when alternative explanations for the evidence in question are “predominant.”  
However, they complement this by noting that the hardest case for a theory is one in which “the 
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variables of that theory are not at extreme levels that strongly push toward that outcome, and… 
all of the alternative hypotheses predict a different outcome in that case.”52  That most closely 
resembles the CC rationale described here, which is effectively “two-legged” Bayesianism: it 
takes the strength of case evidence and its closeness of fit with theoretical expectations into 
account, but does not consider a priori confidence in the theory of interest based on previous 
tests.  The primary work is being done within the P(E|T) term: how likely would one be to 
observe this case outcome, in the face of countervailing pressures (or the absence thereof), if the 
theory of interest were correct? Alternatively, under the Bayesian rationale the hardness of a case 
also depends on the existing confidence in the theory given previous tests. The prior term P(T) 
omits the evidence E from the case the researcher has selected, and is instead based on the results 
of case studies or other methods of research in which the theory has already been evaluated using 
comparable cases.
53
   
One important implication of the preceding observation is that, for new and untested 
theories, a case that appears ML using the CC rationale will be somewhat less likely once a 
Bayesian perspective is introduced.  Consider a case with characteristics that should produce a 
specific outcome according to a researcher’s theory of interest.  The researcher cannot identify 
conditions that countervail against the key explanatory variables in the theory, which happen to 
be at values that should strongly affect the case outcome if the theory is right. Thus, the case is 
ML according to the CC rationale.  However, if the theory itself is untested researchers have no 
reason to have prior confidence in its validity.  They might find that the variables the theory 
purports have the most influence on the dependent variable are actually inconsequential.  Maybe 
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it identifies important variables but does not postulate the right relationships between them.  
Though the case-specific evidence creates favorable conditions for the theory, this is tempered 
by the uninformative nature of the researcher’s prior beliefs.  
It might also be that the theory in question was developed and tested in a context that 
does not resemble the selected case, providing reason to be skeptical about its external validity.  
This rationale is sometimes used to justify the LL label for cases in security studies in which 
psychological theories of decision-making are applied.  Prospect theory, for example, has been 
rigorously tested in numerous controlled experiments, and has been used to explain political 
actors’ propensity towards risky policy choices in many different cases relevant to international 
security.
54
 Nevertheless, neither psychology laboratories nor the typical participants in 
experiments are very representative of decision-making in international politics. Bearing this in 
mind, a recent study of Americans’ attitudes towards the use of force claims that by testing 
prospect theory’s propositions about individual’s risk preferences “in a real-world setting, the 
study’s methodological research design constitutes a hard case” for the explanation.55  In other 
words, the researcher is skeptical of prospect theory’s external validity, and his prior confidence 
in its ability to explain the new data is relatively weak.  Levy’s definition of LL cases as those in 
which a theory’s scope conditions “are satisfied weakly” makes more sense when interpreted 
through this lens.  There may be no compelling reasons to suspect a case falls outside a theory’s 
scope conditions, but also little if information indicating how the theory will perform in the new 
empirical domain. 
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While it is important to keep the Bayesian perspective in mind, an LL case must feature 
some plausible countervailing conditions derived from alternative theories for it to provide 
strong inferential leverage. It is not very persuasive to contend that one should place confidence 
in a theory solely because it succeeds in an instance in which the researcher had uninformative 
priors.  If that were so, then any novel theory that passed exploratory tests would be considered 
more likely valid than not.  Instead, alternative theories should identify numerous countervailing 
factors, as in the CC rationale, in combination with the researcher’s uninformative priors about 
the theory of interest.  Even then, as discussed above and in greater detail in the penultimate 
section of the article, a case may not increase posterior confidence in a theory by much if the 
outcome of interest is very common. 
The Bayesian perspective also qualifies the CC rationale in terms of how the number of 
competing alternative theories impacts the difficulty of a case.  Suppose that numerous distinct 
theories all expect the same outcome in a case.  George and Bennett argue that such a case is ML 
for all theories, because rather than countervailing against one another the conditions deemed 
relevant by each theory reinforce each other’s expectations.56  They are employing the CC 
rationale, and state that this is the best scenario for strong disconfirmation of the theory of 
interest.   Conversely, from the Bayesian perspective there may be a substantial problem with 
this disconfirmation strategy, as the strength of alternative explanations can undermine 
confidence in the theory of interest even if they all expect the same outcome in an “over-
determined” case.   To understand why, recall that the denominator in Bayes’ theorem, which is 
a probability expressing all the ways the observed evidence is generated in the population of 
interest, is a constant.  If it is to remain constant, prior confidence in at least one of the other 
potential explanations already under consideration must decline when another plausible 
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alternative is identified—leading to the fifth and final step in the Bayesian process of selecting 
LL/ML cases.
 57
 Analogously, a doctor can be more confident of correctly diagnosing a patient’s 
illness the first time if there are very few diseases that can cause the patient’s symptoms, rather 
than very many. Researchers must use their judgment to determine whether the prior 
probabilities of some theories are more influenced by the introduction of new explanations than 
others.  The greater the researcher’s prior confidence in the set of alternatives, the less initial 
confidence in the theory of interest.   
To further illustrate, consider Monten and Bennett’s study of crisis decision-making 
during the Gulf War. The authors examine three theoretically unique models of decision-making 
that are “competing and at times incompatible” with one another: one centered on presidential 
leadership, another on bureaucratic politics, and a third on organizational culture.
 
They then 
claim that the Gulf War is a “most likely case” for each of these models, as the explanatory 
variables cited by each exhibited extreme values in the case and thus should all be expected to 
strongly affect political actors’ decisions.58  There are two problems with this assertion.  First, 
even if the variables highlighted by the three theories are all at extreme values, by the authors 
own assertion the theories from which they are derived mainly contradict one another, expecting 
different types of decision-making (the dependent variable) to predominate.  Thus, the key 
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conditions argued to matter in the case countervail against each other’s expected effects, making 
it difficult to see how it could be an ML test for any of the theories from the CC perspective.  
Second, even if one could find a case in which the different models all expected the same 
outcome, it would still be difficult from the Bayesian perspective to place substantial prior 
confidence in any of them.  As Monten and Bennett assert, they are theoretically incompatible 
with one another, and all have been advanced as equally plausible explanations for the case.  
There are three “suspect diseases” here, not one or two.  If another plausible explanation was 
added to the mix, the collective prior probability of the original three theories would have to 
decline even further.  Helpfully, Monten and Bennett further disaggregate the Gulf War into 
multiple cases, or “phases”, and argue that certain theories are more likely to explain decision-
making in some phases rather than others.  This is a useful technique to apply when theories 
appear equally plausible explanations for the broader case, as in the example of the Gulf War.  
Without disaggregation, Monten and Bennett’s case would be closer to a disciplined-
configurative study in which researchers apply established theories to see which better accounts 
for a specific outcome, not to establish the general (in)validity of the theories themselves.
59
  
 
Bayesianism and “Surprising” Results 
Levy writes “The higher the a priori probability that [a] case will satisfy the theory [in 
question], the greater the inferential leverage if the case does not fit the theory.”60 While this is 
correct within the narrower CC framework, in which prior expectations are based only on the 
evidence in a specific case, it is inaccurate if it refers to prior beliefs about the theory’s validity 
for a broader class of similar cases, as in the Bayesian rationale.  Relatedly, Bennett and Elman 
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argue that within a “Bayesian logic” it is true that “the more surprising an outcome is relative to 
extant theories, the more we increase our confidence in the theory or theories that are consistent 
with that outcome.”61  This argument is often correct, but the emphasis placed on fit between 
expectations and evidence masks considerable ambiguity concerning the implications a 
“surprising” outcome has for one’s prior beliefs about a theory and its alternatives, as well as for 
the strength of evidence in the case.   
One reason an outcome may be surprising is that the researcher had great prior 
confidence in a theory due to previous empirical investigations, and yet the theory’s expectations 
were not met in the chosen case.  This is the situation Levy describes above, if one interprets the 
statement from a Bayesian perspective.  McKeown also claims that if a well-accepted theory 
does not account for the outcome in a particular case despite expectations, this finding should be 
treated as highly instructive.
62
 All else being equal, larger errors in prediction do lead to larger 
changes in confidence.  However, if a negative finding is also very surprising because it departs 
from previous evidence supporting a theory, this indicates the researcher had considerable 
confidence in the theory before examining the new case.  The unexpected results are going to be 
offset by the researcher’s strong prior beliefs, and the stronger the prior evidence, the less the 
researcher should alter their confidence in the theory even if its prediction was wrong.
63
  For 
example, some research supports a dynamic interpretation of the democratic peace in which 
democracies gradually learn they can peacefully reconcile their disagreements.
 64
  An observable 
implication is that democratic dyads should be more likely to reconcile their conflicts peacefully 
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over time.  If researchers do observe that peaceful reconciliations of conflicts between 
democracies gradually become predominant, their confidence in the theory should grow. A 
militarized dispute or war between two mature democratic countries would then be surprising. 
Within the CC rationale, one might conclude the theory failed in an ML case.  However, the case 
would be a surprise not only because it upset the theory’s prediction, but also because it 
constituted an exception to the bulk of evidence already gathered.  From the Bayesian 
perspective, the interesting divergent observation would nevertheless do little to undermine 
confidence in the theory as a whole.   
If anything, results that are surprising in light of existing studies should first lead the 
researcher to check for research errors and re-evaluate the strength of the evidence in the case—
does it appear comprehensive, accurate, and open to reliable interpretation? Even if the answer to 
all these questions is “yes,” only additional findings contrary to an established theory’s 
expectations will suffice to substantially weaken confidence in it.  However, such cases are still 
useful as “deviant” observations that may eventually generate new explanations for an outcome 
of interest, and/or better define the scope conditions of the established theory in question.
 65
  
The results of a case may also be surprising if the theory’s expectations were met, and the 
researcher had very low prior confidence in the theory in question.  Confidence may be low 
because the theory has repeatedly failed to account for the evidence in comparable cases, 
meaning the researcher has informative priors about the theory’s invalidity for that class of cases.  
Here, the greater the surprise derived from the results in a case, the stronger the prior beliefs in 
the theory’s invalidity.  Just as it would be erroneous to dismiss an established theory based on 
one failure, one should not embrace a largely discredited theory based on a single apparent 
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success. Thus, surprising results do not necessarily lead to a meaningful increase in confidence in 
the theory whose expectations are met. 
The preceding drives home another substantial implication of adding Bayesian insights to 
the CC rationale for case selection.  From the Bayesian perspective researchers must be careful 
not to select a case that is too hard or easy for the theory of interest, such that their prior beliefs 
are so strong they cannot reasonably be impacted by the results of a single case.  Even if 
conditions in a case strongly countervail against the theory of interest, meaning the case is LL 
within the CC framework, a good fit between theoretical expectations and the case outcome will 
not be that informative if prior confidence in the theory approaches zero.  More difficult tests are 
not necessarily more diagnostic tests within the Bayesian framework.  Likewise, if prior research 
merits a very strong belief that a theory is valid for a population of cases, no single one of those 
ML cases will be useful for disconfirming the theory.  Although anomalous findings can be 
useful for theory generation, this is not the purpose of LL and ML cases, which are instead meant 
to provide substantial inferential leverage from a small number of observations. 
As McKeown’s definition of LL cases acknowledges, it is when one’s priors about the 
theory of interest are relatively uninformative that new evidence has the largest impact on 
posterior beliefs.
66
  Take the situation when a case outcome is surprising from the perspective of 
a previously established theory, but matches the expectations of a less established theory for 
which the researcher has uninformative priors.  This is likely the scenario Bennett and Elman 
have in mind when discussing “surprising” findings.67  In this scenario an unexpected result can 
substantially boost confidence in the unestablished theory, although the established alternative is 
not disconfirmed more generally. As long as prior confidence in the alternative is not so great 
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that confidence in the theory of interest was near zero entering the study, the results will be 
informative.  Similarly, examinations of a theory within a new domain that still falls within its 
scope conditions may yield much stronger inferences about its validity.  For instance, Wohlforth, 
Little, and Kaufman observe that “systemic balance-of-power theory” has been thoroughly 
examined in the modern European context, but not in non-European, premodern settings. They 
claim that studies of the latter contexts are necessary to test the theory’s “transhistorical” 
propositions.
68
  From a Bayesian perspective one could add that while new case studies of the 
European system may do little to alter prior beliefs about how the balance of power functions, 
the paucity of investigations dealing with premodern non-European systems means that these 
studies should have a larger impact on beliefs given researchers’ uninformative priors within 
these domains. 
 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND VIETNAM: HOW HARD A CASE? 
To demonstrate how to put the preceding advice to use, this article examines Nina 
Tannenwald’s argument that a “nuclear taboo” helps explain the non-use of nuclear weapons 
after 1945.  A taboo is a strongly prohibitive norm against behavior socially defined as 
dangerous and repugnant, its injunctions taken for granted as absolute.
69
  Tannenwald argues that 
of all relevant cases, “the Vietnam War provides one of the strongest ‘tests’ [i.e. an LL case] of a 
nuclear taboo.”70  
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The purpose of this section is not to question the validity of claims that a nuclear taboo 
existed in the minds of U.S. leaders during the Vietnam War.  Rather, it is to demonstrate how to 
evaluate the Vietnam case to determine the degree to which it is LL.  One might ask whether 
such an exercise is even appropriate for Tannenwald’s study.  Responding to the possibility that 
there are no true “hard tests” of the taboo’s causal effects, she argues that the more interesting 
question is how the taboo came to be constituted.  Tannenwald and colleagues have also 
expressed skepticism that taboos and other factors impinging on the use of particular weapons 
can be treated as “independent variables” that account for different proportions of variance in 
outcomes.
71
  Nevertheless, these points are belied by Tannenwald’s discussion of how to 
determine the taboo’s “explanatory weight” and claims that “the taboo explanation [for nuclear 
non-use] is ultimately more powerful [than alternatives] because it captures more of the 
evidence.”72 Elsewhere it appears she conceives of the taboo as an interactive variable with other 
conditions that “would not have been as potent” in its absence, or as a “necessary condition” for 
outcomes such as non-use.
73
  Under either conceptualization, the causal strength of the taboo can 
be evaluated relative to other factors affecting the outcome interest.
74
 The following analysis 
shows that, if the steps offered in this article are followed in regards to Tannenwald’s study, her 
contention that Vietnam is an LL case for the taboo is very much weakened.  Whereas it is hard 
to categorize at all during the Nixon presidency, during the years Lyndon Johnson was president 
the relevant theories and evidence indicate Vietnam is actually an ML case.   
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Vietnam and Scope Conditions 
 The first step in determining whether a case can be categorized as LL or ML for a theory 
is to assess whether it falls within the theory’s scope.  Tannenwald observes that the U.S. had 
numerous operational nuclear weapons it could use against targets in North Vietnam if 
policymakers chose to do so.
75
  This satisfies a minimal criterion for placing the case within her 
theory’s scope, but the main complication involves establishing when the taboo became 
prevalent enough that it could have causal effects on behavior at the international level.   
Norms are socially constructed over time in a non-linear fashion.  It takes time for large 
numbers of people to become aware they exist, let alone internalize them as an obvious standard 
for behavior.
76
  This is so for the nuclear taboo as well: Tannewald argues that it “evolved 
gradually ‘bottom up’ as a result of societal pressure,” eventually affecting the beliefs and 
decisions of top policymakers.
77
  Unless a sufficient amount of time has passed for leaders to 
become aware of the existence of a taboo, it cannot affect their decisions regarding nuclear 
weapons.  Cases that fall outside this time frame will be outside the theory’s scope, and rather 
than being LL tests will provide no useful information for assessing the theory. 
It is not essential that Tannenwald specify exactly when the nuclear taboo became 
prevalent enough for cases to fall within its scope.  Instead, she must simply show that Lyndon 
Johnson and his advisers were aware of it.  She does so effectively, tracing the taboo’s gradual 
emergence after the U.S. used nuclear bombs against Japan to demonstrate that by 1964 it had 
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been “internalized” by important civilian leaders.78  A brief allusion to the salience of the taboo 
in 1964, when U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began to escalate sharply, would alleviate 
any confusion about whether the war fell within the theory’s scope conditions. 
 
Expectations of the Taboo Theory 
 For a case to be an LL test of a theory, the theory must precisely specify what outcome 
would be consistent with its expectations.  This will be easier to determine for parsimonious 
theories, as there will be less of a chance that numerous variables highlighted by the theory will 
countervail against each other in a chosen case.  Though the process by which the nuclear taboo 
was generated was complex, its expected effect on the outcome in any case within the theory’s 
scope is clear: policymakers should not use nuclear weapons during military conflicts.  
Tannenwald further details the intervening mechanisms by which the existence of the taboo 
should be connected to non-use.  The taboo should have regulative effects that constrain 
behavior, constitutive effects that shape how state leaders define their interests, and permissive 
effects that shield non-nuclear weapons from similar levels of moral condemnation, thus 
promoting their use over nuclear options.  These effects should be transmitted through the 
mechanisms of domestic and international opinion, and the moral beliefs of political leaders.
79
 
Not only does Tannenwald’s theory have clear expectations regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons, then, but her careful specification of intervening mechanisms allows her to determine 
whether most or all were functioning in a case, or instead appeared inoperative regardless of the 
presence of countervailing pressures. 
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 One way the expectations of Tannenwald’s theory could be made more precise is by 
better articulating the relative causal weight given to intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors.  
Domestic and international opinion are extrinsic: political leaders need not personally subscribe 
to the injunctions of a taboo to recognize that they will face costs if they violate others’ sense of 
decency.  Conversely, if leaders have internalized the taboo into their own belief systems, they 
will be intrinsically motivated to follow it.  Tannenwald and others note that President Johnson 
and his advisers had strong moral qualms about the use of nuclear weapons in addition to being 
aware of outside opinions, while Nixon and his advisers were sensitive to opinion but lacked 
similar moral compunctions.
80
  It is intuitive that the taboo theory would expect Nixon to have 
been less committed to nuclear non-use than Johnson, but to what extent is unclear.  At a bare 
minimum, it is best to disaggregate the Vietnam War into two cases, and acknowledge that, 
ceteris paribus, the start of the Nixon presidency marks the beginning of a harder case for the 
taboo theory. 
 
 
Conditions Countervailing Against the Taboo 
 The weakest part of Tannenwald’s categorization of Vietnam as an LL case is how she 
identifies countervailing conditions that, contrary to the taboo theory, would lead one to expect 
U.S. policymakers to use nuclear weapons during the war.  “In Vietnam,” she writes, “the United 
States chose to lose a humiliating and destructive war against a small, non-nuclear adversary… 
[and] sustained large losses in men, money, and materiel at tremendous political cost.  U.S. 
officials repeatedly declared that the United States could not tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia 
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to Communism, and that the war was vital for U.S. interests, prestige, and security.”81  Aside 
from citing the subjective stakes of the war, two assumptions are made here: first, that nuclear 
weapons would have been militarily useful; and second, that massive “sunk costs” would 
motivate policymakers to take costlier and riskier actions to secure victory.  Although both 
arguments appear plausible, Tannenwald makes little effort to connect them to alternative 
theories supported by evidence.  In fact, her own analysis undermines the assumptions about 
nuclear weapons’ utility. Although members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought nuclear weapons 
might be militarily effective, other analyses were quite skeptical.  The 1966 report issued by 
scientists in the JASON group held that tactical nuclear weapons would not be that useful in 
Vietnam.  Though the effect of the report on senior decision-makers was “vague” according to 
Tannenwald, it weakens her point about the military utility of nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
82
   
More problematic is the assumption about sunk costs driving escalation.  This proposition 
is consistent with prospect theory, which would expect U.S. leaders who perceived themselves to 
be in a “domain of loss” given the costs of fighting would also be more disposed to take risky 
action to salvage victory.  Some writing prior to the publication of Tannenwald’s book had 
suggested the applicability of prospect theory to the Vietnam War and “peripheral” military 
conflicts fought by great powers more generally.
83
 However, the bulk of extant theory and 
evidence contrarily indicated that the U.S. should have been unlikely to escalate based on sunk 
costs. “Rationalist” literature predicts that an attacker will believe the probability of victory is 
decreasing during protracted wars, as a weak opponent would have accepted an early settlement 
deal.  Leaders who learn their opponent is stronger or more resolved than anticipated will 
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decrease their war aims rather than taking risky escalatory actions.
84
  Still, leaders may rationally 
take costly and risky escalatory actions, even if they believe the war is going badly and such 
actions will be suboptimal for their state as a whole, if these “gambles” increase their chances of 
retaining political power.
85
  However, leaders of democracies like the U.S. are quite unlikely to 
engage in this type of behavior, presumably because they do not usually face severe punishment 
(prison, execution, etc.) for losing a war unless their state is conquered by the enemy. After a 
year-and-a-half of fighting, democracies are prone to settle for draws or losses rather than 
escalate.
86
   
 In sum, the conditions Tannenwald cites as countervailing against her own theory’s 
expected outcome are much weaker than she portrays them given the available theory and 
evidence at the time.  One can even reasonably place the period of the war in which Johnson was 
president in the ML category of cases for the taboo.  Johnson was intrinsically and extrinsically 
motivated not to use nuclear weapons, and even without the taboo there was only a small chance 
that nuclear weapons would have been effective on the battlefield or protected his presidency.  
They were not necessary to prevent harsh punishment once Johnson left office, as U.S. leaders 
never feared their country was in danger of being conquered by North Vietnam during the war. 
Since both Tannenewald’s theory and the most plausible alternatives countervail against the use 
of nuclear weapons during this period, Johnson’s presidency falls somewhere in the southwest 
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quadrant of Figure 1.  This does not mean that Tannenwald is wrong to argue that the nuclear 
taboo affected decision-making during the war, but rather one should be hesitant to infer the 
generalizability of the taboo’s effects based on this single case. 
 
Adding Bayesian Elements 
 The main contribution of the Bayesian framework to the preceding analysis is to 
demonstrate that, if confidence in the nuclear taboo theory is to be meaningfully increased, 
treating nuclear non-use as the sole outcome of interest is not going to be very useful.  This is 
due to the (thankful) ubiquity of non-use in the relevant population of cases to which the 
Vietnam War is comparable.  One could define the “relevant” population to include any case of 
militarized conflict involving at least one nuclear power.  However, a more conservative 
approach would solely include cases of “inter-state war” in which only one side had an 
operational nuclear arsenal, as these are most comparable to the cases Tannenwald includes in 
her own studies.
87
  Based on the Correlates of War dataset, this yields 14 cases, including the 
four Tannenwald examines.
88
  In this set of cases, non-use occurs about 93 percent of the time, 
World War II being the only exception. 
Including the nuclear taboo, Tannenwald lists five explanations derived from the 
disciplines of International Relations and history that plausibly account for the non-use of 
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nuclear weapons within the relevant population of cases.
89
  Given the small number of cases, and 
the limited number of studies on the causes of nuclear non-use at the time of Tannewald’s study, 
it is hard to say a priori whether any explanation should be seen as more likely valid than not.
90
 
That is, prior beliefs about the different explanations should be largely uninformative.  This is 
not sufficient to push any case into the LL category for the taboo theory, however, unless there is 
also strong countervailing conditions therein.  As has been shown, theory and evidence indicates 
countervailing pressures were weak in Vietnam, particularly during the Johnson presidency.  The 
typicality of evidence under examination is also crucial.  Assume that prior confidence in the 
taboo theory, P(Ttaboo), is 0.20, and for simplicity, round the probability of nuclear non-use, or 
P(Enon-use), to 0.90. Posterior confidence in the taboo theory after reviewing the Vietnam case 
would only increase if it fit the evidence very well, such that P(Enon-use|Ttaboo) was greater than 
0.90, and even then the gains in confidence would be slight.
91
  
This is another reason why it is important to carefully specify intervening mechanisms in 
a theory.  If the primary outcome of interest is overwhelmingly common in the relevant 
population, one might select as a new outcome one of the intervening causal mechanisms 
specified by the theory being tested, one that is less typical. Usually, researchers using case 
studies will not consider the probability of a single piece of evidence being found given the 
expectations of a theory, but rather the joint probability of observing the outcome the theory 
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predicts along with the intervening mechanisms the theory proposes should produce that 
outcome. As joint probabilities will be less than the unique probabilities of their constitutive 
variables, this will yield a more decisive test.
92
 
In light of all the preceding discussion in this section, a better LL case for the taboo 
theory would be one in which a nuclear-armed state facing a non-nuclear opponent was either a 
moderately repressive “mixed” regime (an “anocracy”), or a democracy that could plausibly be 
overrun by its adversary.
93
  Given the lack of clear examples of nuclear-armed anocracies, the 
1973 Arab-Israeli “Yom Kippur War” would appear to be the best choice.  Tannenwald notes 
that Israel’s refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty may reflect insensitivity (though not 
imperviousness) to the stigma associated with nuclear weapons, and that Israel’s survival was 
arguably at stake in the 1973 war.
94
  
 
HARD CASES IN A HARD FIELD 
This article’s purpose has been to make plain some of the ambiguities and contradictions 
within existing definitions and usage of LL/ML case studies.  Researchers must be careful to 
account not only for the degree to which conditions countervail against theoretical expectations 
in a specific case, but their prior confidence in the theories being investigated for cases 
comparable to the one selected. Before using case studies to perform LL or ML tests researchers 
must devise theories with precise expectations and clear scope conditions.  Rather than relying 
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on ad hoc arguments, researchers should try to find reasonably established alternative 
explanations when specifying whether or not a case represents a difficult test. They must also 
take care that the selected case is not too easy or difficult for the theory of interest from the 
Bayesian perspective: can the case at hand significantly affect the researcher’s confidence in a 
theory given the previous tests to which the theory has been subjected? 
Even if researchers follow the preceding advice, they should remain cautious when 
applying the LL/ML labels.  Given the limitations of theory, as well as uncertainty involved with 
measurement and interpretation of evidence, claims that a certain case represents a hard or easy 
test can normally be challenged on reasonable grounds.  As George and Bennett warn when 
invoking Bayesianism, “it is difficult to judge the probative value of a particular test relative to 
the weight of prior evidence behind an existing theory.”95 Aside from the complications that 
have already been covered, it is virtually impossible to know if the true explanation for a case’s 
outcome is among the alternatives a researcher is considering.
96
  If researchers are not mindful of 
the strong possibility that the actual explanation for the occurrence of a particular outcome is 
missing from the set of theories they are evaluating, they will tend to overestimate the degree to 
which theories have been validated by LL cases.   
 Such challenges are ubiquitous in political science regardless of a researcher’s preferred 
methodology.  Still, these issues loom large when researchers make bold claims, such as the 
ability to strongly support or undermine a theory’s generalizability based on a single case. 
Fortunately, if the procedures laid out here can help researchers identify LL/ML cases, these tests 
are well suited for making the more cautious but still useful claim that, even if we cannot say that 
some theory is “true”, it is better or worse as a general explanation for a political phenomenon 
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relative to alternative explanations.  More hard thinking about hard and easy cases will help 
researchers in security studies to make such gains. 
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